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8 March 1961

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[Redacted]

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# CENTRAL

# INTELLIGENCE

# BULLETIN



[Redacted]

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DIA and DOS review(s)  
completed.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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
- 3. France-Algeria. (*Page ii*)
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\*France-Algeria: Prospects for negotiations between the French and the Algerian rebels now seem to depend on whether agreement on a cease-fire can be reached. Premier Debré's office has denied a 7 March press report citing sources close to the government to the effect that a truce had been agreed on. There have been recent indications, however, particularly in connection with the De Gaulle - Bourguiba talks, that such an agreement may be in the making. It would remove the last major obstacle to direct political negotiations on an Algerian settlement. (Backup, Page 4)

*no*


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Morocco: King Hassan II has apparently convinced himself that the country has rallied around him and is showing no indication of compromising with the demands of the leftist

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
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DAILY BRIEF

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[National Union of Popular Forces for an elected constituent assembly. There is indirect evidence that the new King is considering the abolition of all political parties, possibly as a maneuver to put pressure on the National Union. The King also is endeavoring to capitalize on the unilateral French decision made before his father's death to accelerate the closing of five out of six air training schools in Morocco. Hassan is likely to ask that the United States accelerate the relinquishment of its bases, which is now scheduled to be completed in 1963.] (Backup, Page 6)

CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB SUBCOMMITTEE  
ON BERLIN SITUATION

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The USIB has approved the following conclusions reached by its Special Berlin Subcommittee which reviewed the situation for the period 7 February 1961 through 6 March 1961. *no*

1. We are still in an interim period during which the USSR is intent on reaching an assessment of the new US administration

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and the possibilities of negotiating with the West on major issues. Therefore, the USSR is unlikely to increase tensions over Berlin at this time. However, should the Soviet leaders at any time during this period calculate that additional pressure would bring the West more quickly to high-level negotiations with the USSR, they may increase the threat of unilateral action in an effort to expedite talks.

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2. The Soviet memorandum of 17 February to Bonn, published by the USSR on 4 March, was intended to remind the West that the USSR still insists on an early solution of the Berlin situation through negotiations. The memorandum reinforced Khrushchev's earlier [ ] assertions that the USSR could not agree to postponing discussions beyond the West German elections set for this September.

3. The East Germans have somewhat relaxed their implementation of controls of the Berlin intersector boundary without altering their claims of sovereignty in this regard.

4. While maintaining trade with the West at the level of previous years, East Germany has initiated some of the long-range moves necessary to make its economy independent of Western imports and thereby deprive the West of this leverage in future negotiations over Berlin. [ ]

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Prospects for French-Algerian Negotiations

De Gaulle, ever since his pre-referendum speeches in December, has been blurring his previous insistence on a cease-fire as a precondition for negotiations. (He implied to Bourguiba during their 27 February talk that there would be no preconditions for talks, and Bourguiba conveyed this impression to Abbas. The rebel leaders, however, were reportedly confused when a subsequent "authoritative" statement from Paris reversed this position. Tunisian Information Minister Masmoudi has alleged that members of Premier Debré's entourage also made statements--published abroad, but not in France--that a cease-fire must precede negotiations. Tunisian officials, and probably the PAG, are said to have regarded this as an attempt by "ultras" around Debré to jeopardize the commencement of negotiations.)

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[redacted] following discussions last week between rebel premier Ferhat Abbas, Bourguiba, and a high French official representing De Gaulle, the PAG agreed to a cease-fire and would soon appoint representatives to discuss its implementation with the French. On 6 March Abdelkader Chanderli, PAG "delegate" to the UN, told US officials in Washington that the PAG had proposed to the French that both sides simply agree at the beginning of negotiations to stop fighting, without entering into any formal agreement.)

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[redacted] Bourguiba had told De Gaulle that commencement of direct French-PAG negotiations could not safely be delayed much longer and should start by 20 March. Chanderli, however, asserted, [redacted] that Abbas and De Gaulle will not meet until lower level--but official and formal--negotiations have made substantial progress.)

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Within Algeria, there are diverse elements on both sides still capable of precipitating incidents that could either prevent formal negotiations from beginning or jeopardize their success once begun. De Gaulle is reported to have said that he could scarcely imagine his reaction, if, while seated at a conference

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




table with Abbas, an aide were to hand him a note saying that French children had just been killed in Algeria by rebel terrorists.

The Algerian National Liberation Army is estimated at approximately 10,000 men within Algeria and is dispersed into small bands difficult to control. Rebel terrorists, who have acted semi-independently throughout the rebellion, may consider that the Tunis-based PAG does not represent their interests. There are also indications that the outlawed Algerian Communist party now may be in a position to foment terrorism designed to disrupt negotiations. Well-armed, die-hard European settlers are not now considered capable of threatening De Gaulle's government without military support--which has seemed increasingly unlikely. They could, however, especially in view of the Moslem-European rift evident since the December riots, create spectacular incidents which would antagonize the PAG and cause its leaders to question De Gaulle's good faith.

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Moroccan Political Situation

{ King Hassan II appears not to have made any progress toward the formation of a broadly based government of national union and may have abandoned further moves in that direction for the present. However, he is continuing his efforts to ensure military control throughout the country. The intelligence chief of the Moroccan Army has informed the American military attaché in Rabat that the territorial reorganization of the army, under way since 1959, has been accomplished and the country divided into five military regions, each commanded by an officer with a regional staff. The King's younger brother, Prince Abdallah, may replace Hassan as chief of staff, and General Ben Hamou Kettani, who recently commanded the Moroccan troops in the Congo, may continue operational control of the army. }

{ Meanwhile, political maneuvering among various groups and factions continues. A three-sided division of opinion has developed within the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP). An extremist faction headed by Labor Union Secretary General Mahjoub Ben Seddik wants the UNFP to demand dissolution of the rival right-wing labor group and abrogation of the decree issued last October permitting the creation of other unions. A second faction led by former Premier Abdallah Ibrahim and self-exiled Mehdi Ben Barka continues to insist on the early election of a national constituent assembly, while a third group, led by resistance leaders Abderrahman Youssefi and Mohamed el-Basri, favors reconciliation with the conservative Istiqlal party from which the UNFP split in 1959. }

{ The Istiqlal party, on the other hand, fearful that it may be outdistanced by the UNFP's more dynamic program and leaders, may be seeking an alliance with the tribal-based Popular Movement and the small but well-entrenched Constitutional Democratic party, both of which along with Istiqlal are represented in the present government. }

{ Istiqlal seized on Hassan's 5 March announcement of a "new victory" in securing accelerated French evacuation to reiterate }

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[various demands, including the "liquidation of American bases" prior to the end of 1963 in order to achieve complete French evacuation.]

[French Ambassador Seydoux indicated to US officials on 6 March that France may attempt to remain at Kenitra for "another year or so." [redacted] are reported to consider the recent transfer of some 500 French military personnel from France's recently dissolved headquarters in Rabat to Kenitra as seeking sanctuary in the "American-controlled" base in an effort to keep the evacuation issue alive.]

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The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

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The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Director, International Cooperation Administration

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